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WH/SA 64-489

25 June 1964

**MEMORANDUM FOR:** Chief, WH/Operations (Mr. Hood)

**VIA** : Deputy Chief, WH/SA (Mr. Cheever)

**SUBJECT** : Handling of AMMUG-1 Operation

1. During a meeting with Mr. Hood, C/WH/Ops; Mr. Cheever, DC/WH/SA and Mr. Swenson, C/WH/SA/CI on 23 June 1964, Mr. Swenson reviewed the following points concerning the handling of the AMMUG-1 operation. These points were the subject of earlier discussions by Mr. Swenson and the various Branch chiefs in WH Division.

2. From the outset WH/SA/CI's proposed action for handling AMMUG-1 has been:

a. To debrief AMMUG-1 soonest and to get the information to the appropriate country desks as soon as possible. To run traces, including field traces, and to analyze the results. Traces to be run by WH/SA/CI on Cuban IS staffers and by the WH country desks on Cuban IS agents in their respective countries.

b. To select the best targets from the individuals identified by AMMUG-1 and to hit them in order of priority, considering their overall value, chance of success, accessibility and perishability. The selection of targets to be done jointly by WH/SA/CI and the WH desks,

(1) To give consideration to approaching the Cuban IS agents before the Cuban IS staffers since the agents are less likely to know about AMMUG-1's defection and in most cases they have a greater communication problem in reporting back to the DGI. (The Cuban IS staffers known to AMMUG-1 can not all be recalled or transferred, and even if transferred could still be hit by AMMUG-1.)

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(2) To use AMMUG-1 for making pitches to selected targets, agents first and staffers second as explained above.

c. To provide the information acquired from debriefing AMMUG-1 to the Canadians (RCMP) who were very cooperative in helping us get AMMUG-1 and his documents out of Canada and into the United States. 24

(1) To also [redacted] and [redacted] to prompt them to take any action as we may wish. 24

(2) To give pertinent information [redacted] who can help us in locating and monitoring targets. 24

d. Meanwhile, as in the AMNIP-1 case (another Cuban IS defector who has provided us with considerable information and has been used in a number of approaches), to disseminate appropriate information to the U.S. intelligence community. In the case of personalities, the CSCI dissemination would consist only of biographic and descriptive data furnished by AMMUG-1, including appropriate Headquarters traces. We would request information from them in return. (This procedure has been used in the AMNIP-1 case.)

e. To decide what information we should give the various [redacted] 24

f. To work out in cooperation with the CI and CA staffs what can be done in the event it may be useful at some future date to publicize AMMUG-1's defection by releasing certain information to the press or by possibly having him appear before the Organization of American States.

3. The above represents a general outline of what our overall planning has been in connection with the AMMUG-1 case since we brought him to the United States. The role of WH/SA/CI as I understand it is to manage and coordinate the overall aspects of the operation and to see that no unilateral action is taken by any one interested desk or office that may have damaging affects on other aspects of the operation.

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Harold F. Swenson  
Chief, WH/SA/CI

4/9/62